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Abstract 
We outline four connections between xenophobia and punitiveness toward criminals in a 
national sample of Americans.  First, among self-identified whites xenophobia is more 
predictive of punitiveness than specific forms of racial animus.  Second, xenophobia and 
punitiveness are strongly connected among whites, but are only moderately and weakly 
related among black and Hispanic Americans, respectively. Third, among whites substantial 
proportions of the variance between sociodemographic, political, and religious predictors of 
punitiveness are mediated by levels of xenophobia.  Finally, xenophobia is the strongest 
overall predictor of punitiveness among whites.  Overall, xenophobia is an essential aspect 
of understanding public punitiveness, particularly among whites. 
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Introduction 
When Donald Trump sailed down an escalator at Trump Towers in Manhattan and 
announced his candidacy for President of the United States with a long, extemporaneous 
speech, his opening, defamatory remarks about immigrants received the most media 
coverage:  
When do we beat Mexico at the border? They’re laughing at us, at our 
stupidity. And now they are beating us economically. They are not our friend, 
believe me. But they’re killing us economically. The U.S. has become a 
dumping ground for everybody else’s problems.  [applause]  Thank you. It’s 
true.  And these are the best and the finest. When Mexico sends its people, 
they’re not sending their best. They’re not sending you [pointing to crowd]. 
They’re not sending you. They’re sending people that have lots of problems, 
and they’re bringing those problems with us. They’re bringing drugs. 
They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good 
people…. It’s coming from more than Mexico. It’s coming from all over 
South and Latin America, and it’s coming probably— probably—from the 
Middle East. But we don’t know. Because we have no protection and we have 
no competence.  We don’t know what’s happening. And it’s got to stop and 
it’s got to stop fast.1 
While the media noted that Trump’s characterization of immigrants clearly traded in broad, 
negative stereotypes, his sweeping condemnation of outsiders struck a chord with 
Republican primary and general election voters (Whitehead, Perry, and Baker 2018), with 
support from substantial shares of older white voters in swing states in the Sun Belt 
(Florida and North Carolina) and Rust Belt (Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin) 
(Frey 2016).   
Accompanying his xenophobic stance toward foreigners, Trump’s campaign 
promised a wide range of punitive actions not only against standard rhetorical outsiders 
such as terrorists and criminals, but also against immigrants, refugees, and Muslims.  The 
popularity of Trump’s message and his electoral victories highlight the importance of 
understanding the connections between xenophobia and punitiveness, particularly among 
white Americans.  Building on theories of racial threat and empirical studies of racial 
animus and punitiveness, we examine patterns of punitiveness in relation to xenophobia, a 
more generalized construct than specific forms of racial and ethnic animus, with potentially 
more useful measures.  
 
Racial Threat, Animus, and Punitiveness   
Hegemonic social groups—such as white elites and the middle and upper class in Western 
countries—often identify racial and ethnic minorities as “social threats.”  Racial threat 
theory proposes that social control is wielded by powerful groups in response to perceived 
threats to their collective interests (Liska 1992).  When hegemonic white groups perceive 
non-whites as competition for scarce resources and threats to the power and privileges their 
social groups enjoy, they (either explicitly or implicitly) display discriminatory behavior, 
leading to structural inequalities (Blalock 1967).  As initially posited, racial threat theory 
proposes macro, structural explanations for differential levels of social control directed 
toward minorities in specific spatial areas.  Accordingly, research testing the theory has 
primarily focused on the relationship between macro demographic predictors, such as the 
size of and changes to minority populations, and forms of social control, such as rates of 
arrest for minorities (Parker, Stults, and Rice 2005), the use of police force (Chamlin 1989; 
Jacobs and O’Brien 1998), and enforcing capital punishment (Jacobs and Carmichael 2002).     
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While originally posited to explain macro level patterns of social conflict, racial 
threat theory also provides a useful framework for examining and understanding social 
psychological patterns of racial prejudice and punitiveness, as fear is the precursor to 
prejudice (Stephan and Stephan 2000).  Further, Blalock’s (1967: 29) theory explicitly 
posited fear of minority threats as the link between macro level sociodemographic patterns 
and the motivations for enacting punitive social policies.  Integrating these two levels of 
analysis, researchers have shown that changes to demographic patterns can result in 
increased perceptions of threat among the public (Quillian 1995).  However, while the 
population dynamics of minority groups and the perceived threat of minorities are related, 
they have also been shown to exert independent and interactive effects on punitive ideology 
at the individual level (King and Wheelock 2007; Stewart et al. 2015).  
For instance, demonstrating the potentially complex relationship between 
population dynamics and public perceptions of threat, Hispanic Americans have been found 
to be perceived as more threatening where their population numbers are both scarce (Welch 
at al. 2011) and prevalent (Eitle and Taylor 2008).  Importantly then, perceptions of social 
threat are not wholly dependent on residential proximity or population size, as the 
conflation of race and crime exists even in homogeneous and hegemonic residency areas 
(Chiricos, Welch, and Gertz 2004).  In terms of magnitude, when examined together, 
perceived threat has been found to have a stronger relationship to support for punitive 
policies than population dynamics (Chiricos et al. 2014; King and Wheelock 2007; Wang 
2012). 
Perceived threats from outgroups may be cultural, economic, or criminal in 
orientation (Chiricos et al. 2014). Cross-cultural research has shown increased support for 
punitiveness particularly when minorities are perceived as an economic threat (Wheelock, 
Semukhina, and Demidov 2011).  Accordingly, changes to unemployment rates and the size 
of minority populations can trigger the desire to punish among whites who perceive 
minorities as strains on material resources (Stewart et al. 2015). Another important 
dimension of the link between perceived threat and punitiveness is when outgroups are 
stereotyped as more criminal, as such views have been shown to be a strong and consistent 
predictor of punitive attitudes (Barkan and Cohn 2005; Chiricos et al. 2004; Pickett et al. 
2014; Stewart et al. 2015; Stupi, Chiricos, and Gertz 2016; Welch et al. 2011; Welch 2016). 
Similar to studies of perceived threat, empirical research has shown consistent, cross-
cultural evidence linking animus against specific minority groups to support for harsh 
criminal justice policies (Barkan and Cohn 2005; Unnever and Cullen 2007; Unnever and 
Cullen 2010a, 2010b).  Although hardly a novel strategy (see Mendelberg 1997), Donald 
Trump’s rhetoric and electoral success reiterates that these patterns of public punitiveness 
provide ample opportunity for exploitation by opportunistic politicians who can denigrate 
minority groups as having “no place in our society” in order to portray themselves 
“protectors” (Unnever and Cullen 2010a: 852).  
 
Xenophobia and Punitiveness 
Nearly all of the empirical research on racial animus and punitiveness operationalizes 
minority threat perception by asking about specific racial or ethnic groups (for an exception, 
see Chiricos et al. 2014); however, the broader concept of xenophobia may offer a better way 
of examining perceptions of minority threat by measuring outgroup animus without forcing 
individuals to identify as overtly racist toward specific targets, which is significantly 
influenced by social desirability bias (Krumpal 2012).   
Importantly, racism and xenophobia are related but conceptually distinct phenomena 
(Bernasconi 2014; Sundstrom and Kim 2014; Wimmer 1997). Racism reflects nationalized 
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narratives and a “social/historical structure and a set of accumulated signifiers” (Omi and 
Winant, 2015:125), often devolving, at least in Western societies, to the binary difference 
between black and white (Sundstrom and Kim 2014).  Whereas racism focuses on physical 
characteristics to identify a specific outgroup that is deemed inferior, xenophobia focuses 
more on a sense of fear of the unknown and of a generalized outgroup which exists outside 
the community (UNESCO n.d.). Thus, the differences between racism and xenophobia can 
be understood in terms of hierarchization, as racism implies outgroups can be ranked, while 
xenophobia identifies a generalized outgroup without rankings beyond a “them vs. us” 
dichotomy (Wimmer 1997). As a result, xenophobia and racism can be placed on a 
continuum of increasingly exclusive discourses. So although racism and xenophobia are 
clearly related—racists will also tend to be xenophobes, but less likely the inverse2—there 
is a conceptual difference between a generalized distrust of those-who-are-not-us and 
devaluations of more specific groups identified by physical characteristics. 
While distinct, there are also, of course, many similarities between racism and 
xenophobia.  Like racism, xenophobic beliefs are stereotyped understandings of particular 
categories of people based on erroneous inference biases, which are used as shortcuts for 
quickly reading daily interactions (Rydgren 2004). Also like racism, “essentialism” is a 
primary tool for implementing exclusion, as beliefs about perceived essential differences 
provide the foundation for dehumanization and demonization (Chiricos, Welch, and Gertz 
2004: 379).  Ultimately it is best to understand xenophobia and racism as related, but 
distinct, social phenomena.    
 
Hypotheses 
So what place should xenophobia have in broader theories about and assessments of racial 
threat, animus, and punitiveness?  To answer this general research question, we test four 
specific hypotheses about the connections between xenophobia and punitive ideology using 
a national sample of Americans.   
H1: Xenophobia will be a stronger predictor of punitiveness than more specific forms 
of racial animus among self-identified whites. 
H2: Xenophobia will be a stronger predictor of punitiveness among self-identified 
whites than among self-identified racial minorities. 
H3: Xenophobia will significantly mediate the relationships between 
sociodemographic, political, and religious characteristics and punitiveness among 
self-identified whites. 
H4: Xenophobia will be the strongest overall predictor of punitiveness among self-
identified whites.    
 
Data 
We test these hypotheses by analyzing data from Wave I of the Chapman Survey of 
American Fears, which was collected in April of 2014.  The survey was developed with the 
intent of assessing a wide range of topics involving fear and anxiety, and also included 
standard sociodemographic, political, and religious questions.  The data were collected by 
GfK (previously Knowledge Networks), drawing from its online KnowledgePanel pool of 
respondents.  KnowledgePanel is a probability-based web panel initially generated through 
random digit phone dialing, then maintained using the Service Delivery Sequence File from 
the United States Postal Service, which includes households without telephone lines.  GfK is 
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a long-standing (founded in 1934) consumer research firm with expertise in probability 
samples.  Based in Germany, GfK acquired Knowledge Networks in 2011.    
The data were tailored to be representative of the adult population of the United 
States.  Selected households were asked to participate in an online panel study.  Households 
that agreed to participate but did not have the necessary equipment were provided a 
computer and internet connection in order to complete the survey.  After being added to the 
panel pool, respondents are asked to participate in select surveys and given unique login 
identifiers to access relevant surveys.  In general, this mode of survey collection has been 
shown to be a reliable method for generating parametric national samples (see Baker et al. 
2010; Chang and Krosnick 2009; Yeager et al. 2011).  The completion of the survey in an 
online, anonymous mode also helped reduce desirability bias for questions on sensitive 
topics. 
The 2014 Survey of American Fears was administered in English.  GfK first 
administered a pre-test to 35 respondents to ensure that questions were clear and 
participants adequately understood the procedure. After the successful pre-test, 2,500 
respondents were recruited from the panel to answer the questionnaire.  Of the 2,500 
recruited, 1,572 completed the survey.3   
 
Measures 
Dependent Variable 
The outcome of interest is an index of punitiveness based on a six-question battery with a 
prompt that read: “The criminal justice system should….”  The specific items were: “Make 
sentences more severe for all crimes”; “Use the death penalty for juveniles who murder”; 
“Limit the appeals available for death sentences”; “Use ‘three strikes’ laws for repeat 
offenders”; “Use chemical castration on sex offenders”; and “Reduce the privileges available 
to prisoners (televisions, recreation, etc.).”  Each question had answer choices coded from 
strongly disagree (0) to strongly agree (3), such that higher scores indicate greater 
punitiveness.  A principal components factors analysis yielded a single factor with an 
Eigenvalue of 3.7 and all items loading at ≥ .745.  The index has a Cronbach’s α = .871.    
 
Primary Independent Variables 
To test whether views of immigrants are more predictive of punitiveness than specific forms 
of racial animus (H1), we use three “feeling thermometers,” which asked respondents to rate 
how they felt about specific groups of people on a scale from 0 to 100.  We used feeling 
thermometer measures for “blacks,” “Hispanics,” and “immigrants” to predict the punitive 
ideology index among self-identified white respondents.   
After this initial assessment, we turn to the primary predictor of interest, which is an 
index of xenophobia based on multiple indicators from a prompt that read: “Please indicate 
your level of agreement with the following statements about immigrants.”  The items in the 
battery of questions about xenophobia were designed to tap into fears regarding 
immigration among Americans. Researchers developing xenophobia scales for different 
countries or to be applied cross-nationally (e.g. Jolly and DiGiusto 2014; van der Veer et al. 
2011; van der Veer et al. 2013) have emphasized that such measures should reflect 
commonly held fears regarding unknown others. The Chapman University survey team 
conducted small group interviews and reviewed news reports to identify key terms in 
American discourse on immigration. Though the items differ slightly, they are comparable 
to those used by Jolly and DiGiusto (2014) and van der Veer et al. (2011). 
Race, Xenophobia, and Punitiveness  6 
The six specific statements used to create the additive index of xenophobia were: 
“Recent immigrants are more reluctant to assimilate than previous immigrants”; 
“Immigrants are a drain on the economy”; “Immigrants bring diseases into the United 
States”; “Immigrants are more likely to commit crime than U.S. citizens”; “Deportation is a 
good solution for immigration issues”; and “Creating a ‘pathway to citizenship’ will 
encourage illegal immigration.”  Each question had answer choices coded from strongly 
disagree (0) to strongly agree (3), such that higher scores indicate greater xenophobia.  A 
principal components factor analysis yielded a single factor with an Eigenvalue of 3.7 and 
all items loading at ≥ .730.  The index has a Cronbach’s α = .881.4  Combined, these 
indicators provide a composite measure of xenophobia that incorporates perceptions of 
economic, cultural, and criminal threat from immigrants.5   
Another predictor of interest is the self-identified race or ethnicity of respondents, 
which was coded into four mutually exclusive dummy variables for white, black, Hispanic, 
and mixed or “other” race.  Whites are used as the reference category in multivariate 
analyses of the full sample.  To test whether there are significant interaction effects between 
self-identified race/ethnicity and xenophobia for predicting punitiveness (H2), we created 
three multiplicative terms for the xenophobia index and each of the self-identified 
racial/ethnic categories other than white.6  In models assessing these interactions, the lower 
order coefficient for xenophobia represents its slope on punitiveness among whites, while 
the interaction terms assess whether there are statistically significant differences in the 
slopes of xenophobia among each of the other racial and ethnic categories compared to 
whites (see Aiken and West 1991).   
 
Control Variables  
We also use a number of control variables to account for factors that have been shown to 
predict punitiveness, including sociodemographic, political, and religious characteristics, as 
well as fear of crime, perceived safety, and viewing television shows about crime. 
Specifically, we account for sociodemographic factors shown to be important negative 
predictors of punitiveness, such as education level (King and Wheelock 2007), income (Stupi 
et al. 2016), being currently employed (Stewart et al. 2015), and being a woman (Wang 
2012), as well as factors found to have a positive relationship with punitiveness, such as age 
(Chiricos et al. 2004), being married (Costelloe, Chiricos, and Gertz 2009), urban residence 
(Unnever and Cullen 2010b), and living in the South (Chiricos et al. 2004; Unnever and 
Cullen 2007).  Education was measured in degree categories, ranging from less than high 
school (1) to bachelor’s degree or higher (4).  Annual personal income was measured in 
categories ranging from less than $5,000 (1) to $175,000 or more (19).7  Gender, marital 
status, and employment were coded as three separate dummy variables, such that women, 
those currently married, and those currently employed = 1.  Age was measured in years, 
ranging from 18 to 92.  Rural/urban status was coded as a dummy variable depending on 
whether a respondent’s location was classified by the Census Bureau as metro (1) or non-
metro (0).  Region of the country was coded into four dummy variables for South, 
Northeast, Midwest, and West based on Census designations.  South is used as the 
reference category in multivariate models. 
A consistent and strong predictor of punitive ideology is political identity, with 
conservatives averaging higher levels of punitiveness (Stupi et al. 2016; Wang 2012).  To 
account for this relationship we used a question that read: “How would you describe 
yourself politically?”  Answer choices ranged from “extremely conservative” (1) to 
“extremely liberal” (7), with “moderate” (4) as the middle category.   
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 Religion has also been shown to significantly predict punitiveness.  Specifically, 
fundamentalist Protestant affiliation and beliefs increase punitiveness (King and Wheelock 
2007).  The strongest connection between religion and increased punitiveness has been 
found for belief in religious evil, with believers in such concepts as Satan and hell being 
much more punitive than non-believers (Baker and Booth 2016).  Once these aspects of 
religious ideology are accounted for, higher levels of religious practice may reduce 
punitiveness.  To account for the complex and potentially multivalent effects of religion on 
punitiveness, we included three religious control measures: 1) religious affiliation; 2) a belief 
orthodoxy index that includes fundamentalist views of the Bible and beliefs about religious 
evil; and 3) a measure of religious service attendance.  Affiliation was coded into dummy 
variables for Protestant, Catholic, “other” Christian, Jewish, “other” religion, and no 
religion.  Protestants are used as the reference category for multivariate models.  The 
fundamentalist orthodoxy measure combined questions addressing biblical literalism, the 
belief that “Satan causes most evil in the world,” and the belief that “the world will end as 
prophesied in the Bible.”  Stance on the Bible was measured on an ordinal scale from “The 
Bible is an ancient book of history and legends” (1) to “The Bible means what it says.  It 
should be taken literally word-for-word on all subjects” (5).  Belief that “Satan causes most 
evil” and that Armageddon is impending were measured from “strongly disagree” (1) to 
“strongly agree” (4), with higher scores indicating greater orthodoxy.  The index had a 
Cronbach’s α = .73.8  Religious service attendance was measured from “never” (1) to 
“several times a week” (8).   
 Individuals’ perceptions of their own safety (Chiricos, McEntire, and Gertz 2001) 
and fears about crime (Eitle and Taylor 2008) are also important aspects of punitiveness, 
particularly from the perspective of racial threat theory.  To control for perceived safety, we 
created an index based on five questions that asked about how safe respondents felt in their 
homes at night, walking alone at night, in their neighborhoods, in their cities, and at their 
work or school.  Answer choices were coded from “not safe at all” (1) to “very safe” (4).  The 
index had a Cronbach’s α = .817.  For fear of crime, we created an index by combining nine 
questions from a battery that asked: “How afraid are you of being victimized in the 
following ways?”  The specific questions were about being the victim of mugging, gang 
violence, identity theft, stalking, murder, police brutality, sexual assault, racial/hate crime, 
and mass public shootings.  Answer choices were coded from “not afraid at all” (0) to “very 
afraid” (3).  The fear of crime index had a Cronbach’s α = .928.   
 Lastly, we included an index that assessed levels of viewing television in general, 
and shows about crime specifically, as the consumption of media about crime has been 
shown to predict attitudes about criminal punishment (Rosenberger and Callanan 2011).  
Respondents were asked how frequently they watched TV in general, “true” crime shows 
(such as Dateline or America’s Most Wanted), and fictional crime shows (such as CSI or Law 
& Order).  Answer choices were coded from “never” (1) to “very often” (5).  The TV viewing 
index had a Cronbach’s α = .676.9   
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for all variables used in the study (other than 
the multiplicative interaction terms), as well as the bivariate correlation between each 
predictor and the punitive ideology index.  Providing initial support for H1, for the feeling 
thermometer measures (among self-identified whites only), views of immigrants have the 
highest correlation with punitiveness (r = -.38), as well as a significantly lower overall mean 
score (  = 56.2) compared to specific animus toward “blacks” (r = -.23;  = 68.3) and 
“Hispanics” (r = -.26;  = 65.6).10  Providing initial support for H4, the xenophobia index 
has by far the strongest correlation to punitiveness (r = .45) among the independent 
variables in the full sample, with political liberalism a distant second (r = .29).   
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Study 
Source: 2014 Chapman Survey of American Fears  
* p < .05; ** p < .01 
a: Descriptives among white respondents only 
 
 
Analytic Strategy 
We begin by comparing the relative power of feeling thermometers about “blacks,” 
“Hispanics,” and “immigrants” for predicting punitive ideology (H1).  Because two of the 
questions are about racial and ethnic minorities who comprise a substantial proportion of 
respondents to the survey, we conduct the comparative examination among self-identified 
white respondents only, so as not to bias the assessments against the measures of specific 
forms of racial animus compared to a non-racially specific view of “immigrants.”  Table 2 
presents OLS regression models using the index of punitiveness as the outcome.  The 
models provide a test of the relative magnitude of the partial correlations between specific 
forms of racial animus compared to a more generalized xenophobia (or philia) for predicting 
punitiveness.  We sequence the models such that each feeling thermometer is used 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max r with 
Punitiveness 
Punitiveness 7.19 4.19 0 18 --- 
Xenophobia 8.96 4.05 0 18 .446** 
Blacks therm.a 68.32 24.12 0 100 -.225*** 
Hispanics therm.a 65.54 25.85 0 100 -.261*** 
Immigrants 
therm.a 56.21 28.53 0 100 
-.383*** 
White 0.66 0.47 0 1 .075** 
Black 0.12 0.32 0 1 -.127** 
Hispanic 0.14 0.35 0 1 -.038 
Other/mixed race 0.06 0.24 0 1 .066* 
Education  2.74 1.01 1 4 -.140** 
Income 11.89 4.52 1 19 .004 
Gender 1.52 0.50 1 2 -.047 
Married 0.51 0.50 0 1 .048 
Age 46.86 17.25 18 92 .109** 
Employed 0.56 0.50 0 1 -.051 
Political liberalism 3.77 1.44 1 7 -.288** 
Urban  0.84 0.37 0 1 .020 
South  0.37 0.48 0 1 .025 
Northeast 0.18 0.39 0 1 .049 
Midwest 0.22 0.41 0 1 -.045 
West  0.23 0.42 0 1 -.030 
Protestant 0.36 0.48 0 1 .083** 
Catholic 0.23 0.42 0 1 .069** 
Other Christian 0.12 0.33 0 1 .020 
Jewish 0.02 0.14 0 1 -.081** 
Other religion 0.08 0.27 0 1 -.037 
No religion 0.18 0.39 0 1 -.142** 
Service attendance 3.94 2.48 1 8 .063* 
Belief orthodoxy 4.85 2.85 0 10 .232** 
Perceived safety  14.55 2.95 5 20 -.072** 
Fear crime 6.94 6.05 0 24 .111** 
TV Crime Viewing 9.13 2.74 3 15 .130** 
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independently first.  This allows for comparisons of the size of the coefficients across the 
models.  We then include all the feeling thermometer measures in the same model to see 
which ones remain significant predictors.  Finally, we include all the feeling thermometer 
measures along with our primary multi-item xenophobia index to see how the composite 
measure compares to the single-item thermometer measures for immigrants and specific 
racial and ethnic groups. 
After establishing the relative efficacy of the more comprehensive xenophobia index, 
we then assess the bivariate relationship between xenophobia and punitiveness for those 
who self-identify as different races and ethnicities using scatter plots fitted with 
Epanechnikov kernel density function LOESS lines.  This provides an initial assessment of 
the interaction between racial/ethnic self-identification and xenophobia for predicting 
punitive ideology (H2).  We also assess whether there are significant differences in the 
correlations between xenophobia and punitiveness across racial and ethnic groups.  Next, 
we staged OLS models predicting the punitive ideology index such that the first model 
includes the interactions of interest between race/ethnicity and xenophobia, the second 
model shows only the controls without the xenophobia index or interaction terms, and the 
third model includes the xenophobia index, multiplicative interaction terms, and all 
controls.  Models 1 and 3 in Table 4 provide a baseline and robust assessment of the 
hypothesized interactions (H2), respectively.  All variables were mean centered before entry 
into the models, with the exception of the xenophobia measure and multiplicative terms, for 
ease of graphically representing the results.   
The changes in coefficients for the control variables between Models 2 and 3 in 
Table 4 provide an initial assessment of the potential mediating effects of xenophobia for 
social status characteristics and perceptions of crime and safety (H3). We then offer a more 
rigorous analysis of these mediating effects by using PROCESS modeling developed by 
Hayes (2013), an expansion of earlier work by Preacher and Hayes (2004, 2008). This 
method uses a bias-correcting bootstrapping technique to provide a direct assessment of 
mediating relationships, and has been shown to provide more accurate estimates of indirect 
effects than other analytic methods (Williams and MacKinnon 2008).  We derived estimates 
of the mediating effects of xenophobia on punitiveness among white Americans using 5,000 
bootstrapped samples.  These models allow us to empirically assess the extent to which 
xenophobia is a cognitive mechanism linking social statuses to punitiveness among whites 
(H3).   
Finally, we present standardized coefficients—total (indirect and direct) effects for 
the controls and direct effect only for the xenophobia index—to evaluate the predictive 
strength of xenophobia relative to variables known to significantly influence punitive 
ideology among whites (H4).  This produces a conservative estimate of the strength of 
xenophobia compared to other predictors by accounting for the indirect effects of the 
controls, but not any potential indirect effects of xenophobia through other variables.  This 
allows us to see if and to what extent xenophobia is the strongest predictor of punitiveness 
among white Americans, under empirical conditions favorable to other predictors.      
        
Findings 
Table 2 compares generalized xenophobia to antipathy toward black and Hispanic 
Americans for predicting punitiveness among white respondents using the feeling 
thermometer measures.  When no controls for xenophobia are included, feelings toward 
“blacks” (b = -.022; p < .001) and “Hispanics” (b = -.028; p < .001) are significant predictors 
of punitive ideology; however, the coefficient for general feelings toward “immigrants” is 
substantially larger (b = -.039; p < .001), and Model 3 explains more variance in 
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Table 2. OLS Regressions Predicting Punitive Attitudes by Specific Racial Animus, Views of 
Immigrants, and Xenophobia Among Whites (Unstandardized Coefficients Shown) 
Source: 2014 Chapman Survey of American Fears 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001  
b: South is reference category 
c: Protestants are reference category 
 
punitiveness (R2 = .305) than Models 1 (R2 = .260) or 2 (R2 = .271).11  In Model 4, the 
measures for specific racial animus toward black and Hispanic Americans are attenuated to 
statistical non-significance by including the feelings toward immigrants measure (b = -.044; 
p < .001).  As a comparative test of measures on the same scale, feelings about immigrants 
are a more powerful predictor of punitiveness among whites than more specific forms of 
racial animus, supporting H1.  In Model 5, the primary xenophobia index similarly reduces 
the feelings toward blacks (b = .002; p = .795) and Hispanics (b = .008; p = .395) measures 
to non-significance, and also explains a greater proportion of the variance in punitiveness 
than the models using only the feeling thermometer measures (R2 = .376 for Model 5).12 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Racial Animus      
Blacks therm. -.022***        ---       --- .014 .002 
Hispanics therm.       --- -.028***       --- -.003 .008 
Xenophobia      
Immigrants therm.       ---       --- -.039*** -.044*** -.022** 
Xeno. Index       ---       ---       --- --- .381*** 
Sociodemographic
s      
Education  -.517*** -.458** -.441** -.423** -.222 
Income .031 .031 .039 .042 .017 
Gender -.498 -.516* -.421 -.477 -.359 
Married .209 .201 .178 .184 .201 
Age -.002 -.001 -.001 -.001 -.007 
Employed .527 .524 .522 .498 .287 
Political liberalism -.688*** -.682*** -.615*** -.621*** -.379*** 
Urban residence .183 .160 .219 .218 .401 
Northeastb .389 .431 .323 .309 .392 
Midwestb -.397 -.366 -.437 -.462 -.461 
Westb .956** .956** .830* .774* .595 
Religion      
Catholicc -.274 -.247 -.120 -.054 -.233 
Other Christianc .290 .234 .281 .286 -.039 
Jewishc -1.586 -1.469 -1.142 -1.109 -1.494 
Other religionc -1.144 -1.132 -.876 -.833 -.586 
No religionc -1.184** -1.126* -.997* -.943* -.752 
Service attendance -.129 -.118 -.093 -.101 -.060 
Belief orthodoxy .232*** .235*** .198** .197** .115 
Fear of Crime      
Perceived safety  -.133** -.119 -.111* -.116* -.122** 
Fear of 
victimization .056* .051 .036 .034 .005 
TV Viewing      
Crime shows index .188*** .191*** .175*** .171*** .159*** 
Model Stats      
Constant 12.665 12.949 13.265 12.826 8.047 
N 840 840 840 840 830 
Adjusted R-squared .260 .271 .305 .305 .376 
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Figure 1. Scatterplots of the Relationship Between Xenophobia and Punitiveness by Self-Identified Race/Ethnicity (with LOESS Lines)  
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Turning to the initial test of H2 about the interaction between racial identity and the 
strength of the connection between xenophobia and punitiveness, Figure 1 shows 
scatterplots with LOESS lines for the xenophobia and punitiveness indices paneled by self-
identified race and ethnicity.  There is a strong positive relationship between xenophobia 
and punitiveness among whites, a moderate positive relationship among African Americans, 
and a weakly positive relationship among Hispanic Americans.  This pattern is further 
evident in Table 3.   
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for the variance of both xenophobia and punitive 
ideology within specific racial and ethnic self-designations.  Interestingly the xenophobia 
measure had the highest standard deviation among Hispanic respondents.  This is 
informative, as an initial concern we had in fielding the xenophobia measures was whether 
they would generate adequate levels of variance among ethnic minority populations.  The 
results of the Chapman Survey are promising in this regard.   
Providing more detail about the patterns shown in Figure 1, the last column in 
Table 3 shows the Pearson correlations between xenophobia and punitiveness among 
respondents of different racial and ethnic categories.  The correlation is significantly 
stronger among whites (r = .54) compared to African Americans (r = .25; difference of 
correlations test p < .01) and especially Hispanic Americans (r = .15; difference of 
correlations test p < .01). This provides additional support for H2.  Among respondents of 
“other” or mixed races, there was also a strong correlation between xenophobia and 
punitiveness (r = .45), but the ambiguity of the category obviates clear interpretations of 
this result.  In the bivariate context, the weakest correlation between xenophobia and 
punitiveness was among Hispanic Americans, presumably because of the cultural 
stereotyping of “immigrants” in general with Latino/as specifically (á la Trump).   
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlations between Xenophobia and Punitiveness by 
Self-Identified Race/Ethnicity 
Source: 2014 Chapman Survey of American Fears 
* p < .05; ** p < .01 
Note: Differences of correlations between white and black and between white and Hispanic are 
significant at .001 level (Fisher’s r to z transformation) 
 
Table 4 presents the OLS models predicting punitiveness among all respondents.  In Model 
1, only race/ethnicity, xenophobia, and the interaction terms are included.  The lower order 
terms for mixed or other race respondents (b = 2.138; p < .05) and Hispanic respondents (b 
= 3.596; p < .001) were significantly different compared to white respondents.  This means 
that at the lowest levels of xenophobia (y-intercept), white respondents were less punitive 
than Hispanic and mixed race respondents. Xenophobia had a strong and significant 
positive effect on punitiveness among whites (b = .555; p < .001), but its effects were 
significantly weaker among black (b = -.261; p < .01) and especially Hispanic respondents (b 
= -.409; p < .001).  In Models 1 and 3, the interaction terms represent the difference in the 
slope of the effect for xenophobia on punitiveness compared to whites (e.g., the slope of 
xenophobia on punitiveness is .294 [.555 - .261] for black respondents and .146 [.555 - 
.409] for Hispanic respondents in Model 1).   
 Mean of 
Xeno 
S.D. of 
Xeno 
Mean of 
Punitive 
S.D. of 
Punitive 
r of Xeno. 
and 
Punitive 
White 9.51 4.01 11.03 4.13 .542** 
Black 8.31 3.42 9.31 4.02 .253** 
Hispanic 7.32 4.23 10.43 4.16 .149* 
“Other”/mixed races 8.03 3.98 11.77 4.50 .446** 
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Table 4.  OLS Regressions Predicting Punitive Attitudes by Xenophobia and Self-Identified 
Race/Ethnicity (Unstandardized Coefficients Shown) 
Source: 2014 Chapman Survey of American Fears 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001  
a: Whites are reference category 
b: South is reference category 
c: Protestants are reference category 
   
Model 2 includes all sociodemographic, religious, political, and perception of crime 
and safety controls, while excluding xenophobia.  In this model black (b = -2.190; p < .001) 
and Hispanic Americans (b = -.774; p < .05) have significantly lower levels of punitiveness 
than whites, while mixed or other race Americans have significantly higher levels of 
punitiveness (b = 1.217; p < .01).  To reiterate, these are the baseline differences by self-
identified race and ethnicity, whereas the lower order coefficients for race and ethnicity in 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Fear of Immigrants    
     Xenophobia index .555***               --- .449*** 
Race and Ethnicity    
     Blacka 1.277 -2.190*** .891 
     Hispanica 3.596*** -.774* 3.215*** 
     Other/mixed racea 2.138* 1.217** 2.664** 
Interactions    
     Black*xenophobia -.261**               --- -.281** 
     Hispanic*xenophobia -.409***               --- -.413*** 
     Other race*xenophobia -.054               --- -.091 
Sociodemographics                       
     Education                --- -.466*** -.228 
     Income               --- .044 .020 
     Gender               --- -.600** -.413* 
     Married               --- .174 .191 
     Age               --- .005 .003 
     Employed               --- .243 .184 
     Political liberalism               --- -.675*** -.357*** 
     Urban residence               --- .651* .689* 
     Northeastb               --- .427 .397 
     Midwestb               --- -.474 -.621* 
     Westb               --- .479 .327 
Religion    
     Catholicc               --- .066 .081 
     Other Christianc               --- -.210 -.362 
     Jewishc               --- -1.280 -1.069 
     Other religionc               --- -1.430** -1.138* 
     No religionc               --- -.680 -.270 
     Service attendance               --- -.133* -.063 
     Belief orthodoxy               --- .221*** .145** 
Fear of Crime    
     Perceived safety                --- -.091* -.053 
     Fear of victimization               --- .066** .035 
TV Viewing    
     Crime shows index               --- .185*** .154*** 
Model Stats    
     Constant 5.738 11.063 6.812 
     N 1407 1263 1242 
     Adjusted R-squared .235 .193 .296 
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Models 1 and 3 represent the differences across racial groups at the lowest levels of xenophobia.  
In Model 2, respondents with higher levels of education (b = -.466; p < .001), women (b = -
.600; p < .01), political liberals (b = -.675; p < .001), religious minorities (b = -1.430; p < 
.01), those attending religious services more frequently (b = -.133; p < .05), and those with 
higher perceived levels of safety (b = -.091; p < .05) all had significantly lower levels of 
punitiveness.  Urban residence (b = .651; p < .05), higher belief in religious evil (b = .221; p 
< .001), fear of victimization (b = .185; p < .001), and higher levels of watching television 
about crime (b = .185; p < .001) all had significant positive relationships with higher levels 
of punitiveness.   
Notably, Model 1 predicted more variance in punitiveness using only self-identified 
race/ethnicity and the xenophobia index (adjusted R2 = .235) than Model 2 did with all 
control variables, including sociodemographics, political identity, religion measures, fear of 
crime, perceived safety, and television crime viewing (adjusted R2 = .193). 
 Providing strong support for H2, in Model 3 the interaction terms testing for 
differential effects of xenophobia on punitiveness between white and black Americans (b = -
.281; p < .01), as well as between white and Hispanic Americans (b = -.413; p < .001) remain 
significant, such that xenophobia has a stronger positive effect on punitiveness among 
whites (slope = .449) than it does among black (slope = .168) and especially Hispanic 
respondents (slope = .018).  These differences are presented graphically in Figure 2.   
At the lowest levels of xenophobia index, whites (6.8) are not significantly more 
punitive than African Americans, and are significantly less punitive than Hispanic 
Americans (b = 3.215; p < .001); however, at the highest levels of xenophobia, whites (14.9) 
are much more punitive than both African Americans (9.8) and Hispanic Americans (10.7).  
It is also notable that highly xenophobic whites average close to the maximum score (18) on 
the punitive ideology index.   In sum, there is a very strong connection between xenophobia 
and punitive ideology for white Americans, but only a weak connection among African 
Americans, and there is essentially no connection between xenophobia and punitiveness 
among Hispanic Americans after accounting for control variables.           
Comparing Model 2 to Model 3, the effects for education, gender, religious service 
attendance, perceived levels of safety, and fear of victimization are all attenuated to 
statistical non-significance with the inclusion of the xenophobia and interaction measures.  
Similarly the effects for political identity (b = -.357; p < .001) and religious belief orthodoxy 
(b = .145; p < .01) are substantially reduced between Models 2 and 3.  This provides initial 
support for H3 that xenophobia serves as an important mediator connecting 
sociodemographic, political, and religious characteristics to higher levels of punitiveness.       
To further examine these mediating effects, Table 5 shows the results of the 
PROCESS models estimating the direct and indirect effects of significant variables that 
showed substantial mediation across the OLS models.  Because xenophobia is connected to 
punitiveness primarily among whites, these models were conducted using white 
respondents only.  Table 5 also shows standardized coefficients for total effects for these 
variables that incorporate both direct effects and indirect effects (mediated through the 
xenophobia index).  Xenophobia was a significant predictor of all the variables examined, 
with the exception of perceived safety.  Consequently, estimates of the indirect effects of 
perceived safety through xenophobia were non-significant.  For gender, political identity, 
religious service attendance, religious belief orthodoxy, and fear of victimization, the indirect 
effects through xenophobia were stronger than the respective variables’ direct effects on punitiveness 
(indirect-to-total effect ratios above .5).  In other words, greater than half of the overall 
effects for these variables were indirect, mediated by virtue of being associated with 
differential levels of xenophobia.  
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Table 5. Mediation of Significant Predictors of Punitive Attitudes through Xenophobia among 
Whites 
Source: 2014 Chapman Survey of American Fears 
PROCESS Mediation Models (see Hayes 2013) 
 
While the indirect effects for education are slightly smaller (indirect-to-total effect ratio = 
.47), they were also substantial and significant (b = -.356 for direct effect and b = -.317 for 
indirect effect).  Thus, we find consistent support for H3, as most of the effects of social 
status characteristics on punitiveness among whites are accounted for by differential levels 
of xenophobia across such characteristics.  
Finally, in support of H4, xenophobia has by far the strongest relationship to 
punitiveness among the predictors assessed (β = .498), with a standardized coefficient 69% 
higher in absolute value than the second strongest predictor of political identity (β = -.294). 
This is particularly noteworthy since the standardized coefficients presented are a 
conservative assessment of the relative strength of xenophobia, allowing the other 
predictors to include indirect effects as part of the estimates of their respective total 
standardized effects.   
 
Discussion 
The results show strong support for the four hypothesized connections between xenophobia 
and punitiveness.  First, xenophobia is a better predictor of punitiveness than more specific 
forms of racial animus among white Americans.  Second, the relationship between 
xenophobia and punitiveness is contingent on self-identified race.  There is a much stronger 
positive relationship between xenophobia and punitiveness among whites than among black 
and Hispanic Americans.  While there is a moderate positive relationship between 
xenophobia and punitiveness among African Americans, it is significantly weaker than 
among whites. Among Hispanic Americans, there is only a very weak connection between 
xenophobia and punitiveness after accounting for control variables.  Third, xenophobia also 
significantly and substantially mediates the relationship between social, religious, and 
political characteristics and punitiveness among self-identified whites.  Finally, not only 
does xenophobia operate as a cognitive mechanism linking status characteristics to 
punitiveness among whites, it is by far the strongest overall predictor of punitive attitudes 
among whites.   
Collectively these findings show that for white Americans negative views of 
“immigrant” outsiders provide a dominant framework for justifying harsh penal policies and 
practices.  Returning to our general research question, xenophobia is an indispensable and 
integral aspect of understanding punitive attitudes and perceptions of racial threat, 
particularly among whites.  Consequently, xenophobia should assume a more central place 
in theories about and studies of the relationship between racial threat and punitiveness.   
In addition to integrating xenophobia into theories of racial threat, the connections 
 Direct  
Effect (b) 
Indirect  
Effect (b) 
Indirect/Total 
Ratio 
β for Total 
Effect 
Xenophobia .449              --- --- .498 
Education -.356 -.317 .471 -.162 
Gender -.212 -.219 .508 -.052 
Political liberalism -.376 -.429 .533 -.294 
Attendance -.076 -.112 .596 -.113 
Belief orthodoxy .104 .118 .532 .152 
Fear of victimization -.006 .060 1.111 .068 
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between xenophobia and punitiveness in political rhetoric and electoral strategy should also 
receive more attention from scholars.  Accepting the nomination of the Republican Party for 
President, Donald Trump told listeners that: 
Nearly 180,000 illegal immigrants, with criminal records, ordered deported 
from our country, are tonight roaming free to threaten peaceful citizens…. 
They are being released, by the tens of thousands, into our communities, with 
no regard for the impact on public safety or resources.  
 A few weeks later, in a speech about immigration, he promised the following as part of his 
policy agenda:  
This is the one, I think it's so great. It's hard to believe, people don't even talk 
about it. Zero tolerance for criminal aliens. Zero. Zero. Zero. They don't 
come in here. They don't come in here.  According to federal data, there are 
at least two million—two million, think of it—criminal aliens now inside of 
our country. Two million people, criminal aliens. We will begin moving them 
out day one.  As soon as I take office, day one.xiii 
As the phrasing, emphasis, and intonation made clear, the eventual President believed that 
undocumented immigrants warranted extremely harsh punishment.   
The fact that Trump’s campaign successfully secured a major party’s nomination and 
eventually the Presidency is testament to the prevalence of these views among 
contemporary white Americans.  Overall this signals a shift away from “dog whistle” 
rhetoric about race, crime, and punishment (López 2014), toward more overt “bullhorn” 
rhetoric about “criminal aliens.”  As politicians, both national and local, follow suit and 
increase rhetorical emphasis on immigrants and crime, it is important to understand how 
the American public connects these issues. 
In short, if politicians are able to stoke fears about immigrants, they can also increase 
support for punitive criminal justice policies and practices.  The remaking of political 
rhetoric about racial threat toward xenophobia also presents a serious impediment to 
criminal justice reforms that, for a moment, had attained some bi-partisan support (Obama 
2017).  To the extent that right-wing politicians link opposition to immigrants and punitive 
rhetoric about crime with greater frequency and intensity, support for criminal justice 
reform is likely to decline among political conservatives.  More disconcerting still, our 
analyses show that Trump’s overt focus on immigrants rather than dog whistle coding 
about race may be more effective at mobilizing public fears, and therefore animosity toward 
those viewed as outsiders.   
Due to institutional characteristics of the criminal justice system in the U.S.—such 
as electing judges, and politicians beholden to localized constituencies—public opinion 
about punishment has a greater impact on policies in the U.S. than in other Western 
democracies (Savelsberg 1994).  As a result, if public opinion takes a turn back toward 
greater punitiveness, harsher public policies are likely to follow.  Indeed, recent research 
shows that changes in public punitiveness led to changes in social policy and political 
messaging, rather than the inverse (Enns 2014, 2016). The decades-long expansion of harsh 
punitive policies occurred in the United States because of the voting public’s desire for “just 
deserts.”  The role of the public’s (perceived) “knowledge” about crime warrants a more 
prominent place in the ongoing discourse about the causes of and barriers to the reversal of 
mass incarceration.  Within such a discussion, the role of perceptions of minority threat 
from racial and ethnic “others” must be central rather than peripheral.     
Regarding studies of racial threat and animus, xenophobia has some advantages that 
recommend its utility.  Racial animus measures often ask respondents to select the degree to 
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which they hold favorable or unfavorable attitudes about members of specific racial or 
ethnic groups.  Such measures are primarily useful across groups (i.e., by looking at how 
non-black respondents feel about “blacks”); however, questions about non-ethnically 
specified “immigrants” allow for flexibility in application and context.  Questions about 
generic immigrants allow for the possibility of more comparative studies about minority 
threat across cultural contexts, regardless of which types of individuals are perceived by 
different publics as constituting “immigrants.”  Questions about immigrants are also less 
likely to be perceived by respondents as eliciting overtly racist attitudes, and can help avoid 
desirability bias (see Quillian 2006).  Racially or ethnically non-specific measures of 
xenophobia effectively split the difference between measures of explicit and implicit racial 
bias (Dovido, Kawakami, and Beach 2003).   
While our study has contributed to the literature on racial animus and punitiveness 
by shifting attention to the importance of xenophobia over specific forms of racial animus, it 
is also limited in a number of ways.  In particular, a full integration with the theory and 
literature on racial threat requires an assessment of population dynamics in relation to 
xenophobia.  Nested data that can account for levels of and changes to immigrant 
populations while assessing individual-level patterns of xenophobia are needed.  Testing 
these dynamics with data from different national, regional, and cultural contexts is 
ultimately what is required for a more comprehensive evaluation of xenophobia within the 
context of racial threat theory.   
Similarly, aggregate data on levels of xenophobia and punitive policies and practices 
are needed to more rigorously evaluate whether and how collective xenophobia shapes 
criminal justice policies and outcomes.  At the individual level, connecting xenophobia to 
psychological traits and outcomes, as well as to social network dimensions, is needed to gain 
a better understanding of how xenophobia is similar to, and different from, more specific 
forms of racial and ethnic prejudice (see van Zalk, Walter, and Kerr 2014).  Also at the 
individual level, targeted samples of mixed race Americans with additional questions about 
ethnic identity are needed to improve some of the suggestive but ambiguous findings shown 
here.   
Likewise, while we have shown that xenophobia is a strong predictor of punitiveness 
among white Americans, our data are cross-sectional and country specific.  Although much 
of the research on these topics has been conducted in the West, connections between 
xenophobia and socio-political context are by no means limited to Western contexts. 
Explorations of the connections between xenophobia and punitiveness in different cultural 
contexts, within specific sub-populations, and at higher levels of analysis such as aggregates 
of public views within political boundaries (e.g., counties, states, and nations) all warrant 
further research. Understanding of the social dynamics of xenophobia is particularly 
important to studies of right-wing and penal populism, as these dimensions of ideology are 
inextricably connected.  
Conclusion  
Punitiveness is intimately linked to fear and sense of security.  Xenophobia is a uniquely 
important dimension of fear in relation to punitiveness because it is fundamentally a fear 
about both outsiders and the social order.  Attempting to neutralize the fear of change from 
outsiders, individuals who are in racial or ethnic in-groups are more likely to hold harsh 
attitudes toward outsiders and perceived rule-breakers, and to endorse accompanying 
draconian policies.  Whenever powerful groups feel threatened, xenophobia is likely to 
intensify as the dark underside of in-group solidarity.  The endorsement and enactment of 
punitive measures by racial and ethnic majorities are an oppressive outgrowth of the fear 
that society will soon belong to “them” rather than “us.”       
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Notes 
1 Quote is from authors’ transcript of the speech.  Full text of Trump’s presidential announcement speech is 
available at: http://time.com/3923128/donald-trump-announcement-speech/.  
2 For instance, in the 2014 Chapman Survey of American Fears, among white respondents who rated “blacks” 
below 50 on the feeling thermometer, 78% also rated “immigrants” below 50.  Conversely, of white 
respondents who rated “immigrants” below 50 on the feeling thermometer, only 35% rated “blacks” below 50.  
3 The sociodemographic frequencies in the Chapman Survey compare favorably to those from the 2014 
General Social Survey.  One area of difference was that the Chapman Survey has significantly more currently 
married respondents (58.9%) than the GSS (45.7%).  Tabled results of the comparisons are available upon 
request. 
4 Supplemental analyses with a xenophobia index weighted by factor loadings produced results identical to 
those presented.   
5 We did not use a question from this battery about whether police should be allowed to conduct raids to find 
undocumented immigrants because of its similarity to the punitiveness outcomes.  In support of the centrality 
of economic concerns in racial threat theory, the measure for whether “immigrants are a drain on the 
economy” had a stronger relationship to the punitive ideology outcome (r = .498) than the question about 
whether “immigrants are more likely to commit crime” (r = .399).  
6 The xenophobia index had high reliability for scaling across the racial and ethnic categories.  For black 
respondents, the items loaded on a single factor with an Eigenvalue of 3.5.  For Hispanic and mixed race 
respondents there were single factors with Eigenvalues of 3.7 and 3.8, respectively.   
7 We also tested models that used a series of dummy variables for education and income levels.  Results did 
not differ substantially from those presented, with college graduates being significantly less punitive, and non-
significant results for income levels.  We also tested for potential non-linear effects of income using logged 
and quadratic measures.  These results were statistically non-significant.   
8 We created this index of “belief orthodoxy” that included views of the Bible for consonance with previous 
research on punitiveness, but supplemental analyses examining the individual indicators (belief in an active 
Satan, belief in future Armageddon, and Bible views) showed that beliefs about Satan were more predictive of 
punitive ideology than beliefs about the Bible, Armageddon, or the overall orthodoxy index.  This provides a 
replication of the recent finding that an important aspect of religiosity for predicting punitiveness is views of 
supernatural evil (Baker and Booth 2016). 
9 Due to the marginal reliability of the TV viewing index, we conducted supplementary analyses excluding 
this control.  Focal results for the connections between xenophobia and punitiveness were unchanged.  Among 
the specific indicators, punitiveness had the highest correlation with consuming “true crime” television shows.   
10 P < .001 for paired samples T-tests of the differences between mean scores on the “immigrants” 
thermometer compared to the thermometers for “blacks” and “Hispanics.” 
11 Z tests for significant differences of coefficients across Models 1–3  (see Paternoster et al. 1998) showed a 
statistically significant difference between the coefficients for “blacks” and “immigrants” (Z = 2.40; p = .01) 
and a marginally significant difference between the coefficients for “Hispanics” and “immigrants” (Z = 1.60; p 
= .05, one-tailed tests).   
12 The xenophobia index (VIF = 1.8) had a relatively low level of multicollinearity in this model.  The feeling 
thermometer measures had elevated, but tolerable, levels of multicollinearity (VIF = 2.6 for “blacks” and 
“Hispanics” thermometers; VIF = 3.0 for “immigrants” thermometer). 
xiii Quotations are from authors’ transcripts of both speeches.  Textual transcripts are publically available for 
the nomination speech (http://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/full-transcript-donald-trump-nomination-
acceptance-speech-at-rnc-225974) and the immigration policy speech (http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-
pol-donald-trump-immigration-speech-transcript-20160831-snap-htmlstory.html).  
																																																								
